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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The owner of a severed oil and gas title covenanted to 
pay the surface owner amounts equal to 2 1/2% of the value of 
the oil and gas produced from the property, the covenant being 
made in consideration of the surface owner's grant of oil and 
gas operating easements; the case involves conflicting claims 
upon the benefit of the covenant. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court decreed that the defendant-respondent 
parties are entitled to specified fractions of the "moneys paid 
heretofore and hereafter" by reason of the covenant, and 
granted them money judgments against appellant for past 
payments made to appellant by the oil and gas owner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks vacation of the lower court's 
judgment, and a remand with directions for entry of a judgment 
declaring that appellant holds the entire benefit of the 
covenant and its proceeds* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preliminary Statement 
This appeal is taken from the adjudication of one 
count of a five-count complaint. The complaint, filed by 
appellant Flying Diamond Oil Corporation ("Flying Diamond") 
seeks declaratory relief to construe a contract covering its
 ( 
purchase of a sheep ranch property from the respondent Newton 
parties ("the Newtons"). Respondent Bass Enterprises 
Production Company ("Bass") intervened as to Count I only. By
 1 
agreement of the parties and upon the trial court's order, 
Count I was bifurcated and tried separately. The other counts 
remain pending in the court below. < 
-2-
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In Count I Flying Diamond seeks a declaratory judgment 
that, notwithstanding the Newtons' contrary demands, Plying 
Diamond is entitled to all benefits of a covenant made by 
Charaplin Petroleum Company ("Champlin") to make payments equal 
to 2 1/2% of the value of oil and gas production from certain 
sections of the ranch property. Flying Diamond^ the owner of 
the surface, claims ownership of the covenant benefits as 
successor surface owner in accordance with the terms of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement in which the covenant was made. By 
counterclaim and cross-claim, the Newtons and Bass assert 
fractional interests in the covenant and the payments by virtue 
of royalty conveyances made before Flying Diamond acquired its 
surface ownership. 
The appeal requires the construction of three 
conveyances. The factual title history is not disputed, and 
the summary in this brief refers to the Clerkfs record with the 
notation "R ." The summary of the trial evidence is 
supported by reference to the reporter's transcript, shown 
below as "Tr ." (Throughout the transcript, the word 
"surface'1 appears as "service"; it is believed that formal 
corrections are not necessary as the intention of the speaker 
is clear enough from the context). 
General Title Chronology 
The conveyances requiring construction are the Surface 
Owner's Agreement (dated in 1971) which created the 2 1/2% 
-3-
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covenant interest, a mineral Deed (1972) , and a Ranch Purchase 
Contract (1974). Each of these affects the mineral or surface 
title to the former Newton Sheep Ranch, a property of about 
20,000 acres situated in Summit County. 
About half of the Ranch consists of "railroad" 
sectionSc These, typically, are the odd-numbered sections 
which were patented to Union Pacific Railroad Company under the 
congressional land grants in aid of railroad construction. The 
history of those railroad sections involved in this case is 
that Union Pacific sold the surface to ranchers, retained the 
minerals thereunder, and later transferred the oil and gas 
title to Champlin, its oil and gas subsidiary (R 278). The 
even-numbered sections comprising the balance of the Ranch are 
the so-called "fee" sections (about 9,300 acres) and in these, 
typically, the rancher held both the surface and the mineral 
title. 
For some years before the execution of the Surface 
Owner's Agreement, the surface title to the Ranch was held by 
Hyrum J. Newton & Sons Sheep Company (the "Newton Company11). 
The Newton Company also held the mineral title in the fee 
sections. The severed oil and gas title in the railroad 
sections was held by Champlin (R 278). The Surface Ownerfs 
Agreement, executed in September 1971 between the Newton 
Company and Champlin, covered six of the railroad sections (R 
278-9? Exh. 1 at R 285). 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Later in 1971 the Newton Company's.interest in the 
Ranch was transferred to a family limited partnership, 
appellant Newton Sheep Company ("Newton Sheep") (R 279). 
A transaction in February 1972 between Newton Sheep 
and Bass resulted in execution of a Deed conveying to Bass one 
half of the minerals in the fee lands, and one half of any 
royalty to which Newton Sheep was entitled in the railroad 
sections (R 279; Exh. 2 at R 293). 
In 1974, Flying Diamond bought a major part of the 
Ranch from Newton Sheep under the Ranch Purchase Contract (R 
279; Exh. 3 at R 298). As to the portion so acquired, the 
Contract granted to Flying Diamond the full surface title, 
one-half of any mineral rights still held in the fee lands, and 
one-half the royalty owned by Newton Sheep in the railroad 
sections. 
After Flying Diamond's ranch acquisition, oil and gas 
discoveries were made by Champlin within certain of the 
railroad sections which are subject to all three coveyances: 
the Surface Owner's Agreement, the Newton-Bass Deed, and the 
Ranch Purchase Contract (R 279). 
Flying Diamond acquired the Ranch surface in 1974, 
before any oil discovery, and since the beginning of production 
Champlin has remitted to Flying Diamond monthly cash payments 
equal to 2 1/2% of oil and gas sales proceeds (R 279), and 
continues to do so. (Pursuant to agreement among the parties, 
Flying Diamond is forwarding three-fourths of the monthly 
remittances, as they are received, to be held by an escrow 
agent until the case is resolved). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A summary of the conveyances follows: 
Surface Owner's Agreement, dated September 24, 1971, 
between the Newton Company, as Land Owner, and Champlin (Exh. 1 
at R 476-83). By this agreement, the Land Owner grants to 
Champlin easements to enter upon the surface, to drill, and to 
maintain specified surface "facilities" convenient to 
Champlin1s oil and gas operations. In consideration, Champlin 
covenants (1) to make payments in cash equal to 2 1/2% of the 
value of oil and gas produced and marketed? (2) to pay rentals 
measured by the agricultural value of such surface as may be 
taken up in related unit operations? and (3) to pay for all 
damages to the surface and improvements. The agreement 
provides that no other payments shall be due the surface owner. 
Section 7 provides that the three payment covenants 
are covenants "running with the surface ownership"; that they 
shall not be held, or transferred, separately from the surface 
ownership; and that the payments will be paid to the person or 
persons owning the surface at the time an individual payment 
becomes due, and to the subsequent surface owners, upon a title 
showing. Section 8 provides that the surface easements are 
appurtenant to the mineral title, and will bind the surface and 
all present and future surface owners. The agreement has an 
indefinite term, typical in oil and gas conveyancing: one year 
and so long thereafter as the oil and gas title is committed to 
a lease or a unit, or so long as production or operations 
continue. The agreement is assignable, subject, however, to 
-6-
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the Section'7 provisions stating that the payment covenants are 
inseparable from the surface ownership. 
The inseparability provisions of Section 7 are quoted 
and analyzed in Point 1(b) of the Argument below. A copy of 
the Surface Ownerfs Agreement is included in this brief as 
Appendix A. 
Deed, dated February lf 1972, made by Newton Sheep, as 
Grantor, to Bass, as Grantee (Exh. 2 at R 484-8). Subparagraph 
A.l. of the Deed grants a one-half interest in the oil, gas and 
other minerals in specifically described "fee lands" (9,316 
acres); Subparagraph A.2., a catch-all clause, grants a like 
mineral interest in all of Grantor's fee lands within all 
affected townships. Subparagraph B.I., covering the railroad 
sections, conveys to Grantee " . . . one-half of the royalty (of 
any type) from production of minerals that the Grantor actually 
receives or is entitled to receive . . . " from the "Union 
Pacific Railroad Company Lands" (10,003 acres). Other 
provisions create for Bass a first right of purchase, a 
covenant of further assurances, and a warranty of title. 
Newton Sheep also makes two specific warranties concerning the 
so-called royalty interest which are discussed below. 
A copy of the Deed is included as Appendix B. 
The Newton Ranch Purchase Contract, dated April 12, 
1974, made between Newton Sheep, as Seller, and Flying Diamond, 
as Buyer (Exh. 3 at R 489-520). By the Contract, Flying 
Diamond acquired a warranted "full" surface title, one-half of 
-7-
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the oil, gas and other minerals then owned by Seller in the fee 
lands, and one-half of the "royalty (of any type)" in the 
railroad lands to which Seller is entitled, Newton Sheep also 
makes the same two specific warranties concerning the royalty 
interest as were set out in the Bass Deed, 
Proceedings 
Before trial, Flying Diamond moved for partial summary 
judgment based on the theory that the Surface Owner's Agreement 
operates to vest all rights in the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant in Flying Diamond, as successor surface owner, as a 
matter of law* Bass also made a motion for summary judgment, 
its theory being that the Deed's grant to Bass of one-half of 
the "royalty (of any type)" in the railroad lands was a grant 
of one half of the 2 1/2% covenant interest* Both motions were 
denied. 
At trial, over Flying Diamond's objection, Bass and 
the Newtons introduced evidence to support their contention 
that the "royalty (of any type)" language in the Deed was 
intended to operate as a grant to Bass, and a reservation to 
Newton Sheep, of one-half each of the 2 1/2% covenant, William 
Collister, a Denver attorney retained by Bass to prepare the 
Deed, testified by deposition that subparagraph I*B. was 
intended to cover the royalty from production from the Union 
Pacific lands (Deposition of Collister (R 527), p, 21, line 25 
- p. 22, line 30), royalty meaning, in his use of the phrase, 
"the two and a half percent royalty in the surface owners 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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agreement." (Deposition, p. 22, lines 24-25); see Tr 89 
(introduction of Collister deposition at trial). 
Mr. Collister further testified that he felt the words 
of grant in the Deed were sufficient to convey property in Utah 
(Deposition, p. 34) and that: "And my deed paragraph A conveys 
minerals and paragraph B conveys royalty. And there is a 
distinction11 (p. 49, lines 6-7). Asked whether those two basic 
kinds of interests (mineral and royalty) included all kinds, 
the witness said "No, there are other things in existence 
clearly. The contractual right to receive monies, you know." 
(p. 49, lines 22-24). 
With respect to the subject of a claimed estoppel of 
Flying Diamond, Scott Newton and Ralph Newton, general partners 
of Newton Sheep, testified that in the discussions preceding 
the sale of the Ranch in 1974, they advised Flying Diamond of 
Newton Sheep's earlier sale of one-half of the 2 1/2% payable 
in the railroad sections (Tr 64, 80) and that, having sold 
one-half to Bass, they (Flying Diamond) "would take a quarter 
of what was left of the half, and we would keep a quarter." 
(Tr 65) 
Without waiving its earlier objection to all extrinsic 
evidence, Flying Diamond introduced the deposition testimony of 
the Land Manager of Champlin (Robert Lagerstrom) (Tr 90, R 528) 
about the purpose of the Surface Ownerfs Agreement: 
What we told the landowners was what we took to be the 
purpose. It was to obtain their cooperation, to keep 
their goodwill, to prevent any disputes which might 
arise from uses that someone might consider beyond the 
scope of our reservation, and to provide a reasonable 
compensation to the landowner for his cooperation. 
(Deposition of Lagerstrom, p. 21.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As to Section 7, the witness stated the purpose to be: 
To assure that the benefits provided under the 
agreement would continue to be paid to the owner of 
the surface, so that Champlin or Union Pacific as the 
owner of the minerals would continue to have a contact 
with that surface owner. (Deposition of Lagerstrom, 
pc 24.) 
The trial exhibits show that when Newton Sheep was 
formed in 1971 and received its deed to the Ranch, it so 
advised Champlin, and that Champlin accepted the copy of the 
deed as sufficient for purposes of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement (Exh. 10 at R 523). On December 21, 1971, Champlin 
clarified its earlier letter by advising Newton Sheep that 
(Plaintiff's Exh. 9 at R 521) (emphasis added): 
In order to clarify any possible confusion 
:
 regarding the statement quoted above from our letter 
of December 7th, please be advised that payment of 
2 1/2% of the value of production, if production is 
ever obtained, will be made to Newton Sheep Company 
only as long as Newton Sheep Company is the current 
land owner, " "~ ~ — 
As indicated in our letter of December 7th and as 
recited in Section 7 of the Surface Owner's Agreement, 
the covenants of the Surface Ownerfs Agreement run 
with the surface ownership of the described premises. 
Therefore, if lands under production which are covered 
by this subject agreement was ever conveyed by Newton 
Sheep Company, then of course, Champlin's obligation 
to pay the 2 1/2% of the value of each production 
would, upon sufficient notice to Champlin, transfer to 
the new surface owner. 
Plaintiff's Exh. 20 (R 524) shows that, while Bass was 
negotiating the Deed transaction with Newton Sheep, Bass was 
advised by James Wallace (Bass's agent) that * [a]s long as they 
[Newton Sheep] own the surface they will receive 2 1/2% in the 
form of royalty which figures 128 mineral acres per section." 
(Emphasis added). 
-in-
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The lower court ruled in favor of the Bass-Newton 
parties. Its findings are, essentially, that the conveyancing 
intent of all parties was to acquire or reserve fractions of 
the "2 1/2% payment" (that being the term used in the Findings 
to mean the Section 2 payment interest (R 427)) and the 
conclusions are that the conveyances had that legal effect (R 
429). The court also concluded that Flying Diamond was 
estopped, and that the Bass-Newton parties were not (R 429), 
Flying Diamond, as directed, submitted an accounting showing 
the payments made to it by Champlin. The court then entered 
the Final Judgment, which decrees that the Newtons are entitled 
to one-fourth, Bass is entitled to one-half, and Flying Diamond 
is entitled to one-fourth ". . .of the moneys paid heretofore 
and hereafter by Champlin under Section 2 of the Agreement," 
and which grants recovery from Flying Diamond of the respective 
fractional portions of the monies paid (R 460-463). The 
judgment also contains the court's express determination of 
finality required for appeal by Utah R. Civ. P. 54. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The 2 1/2% easement payment covenant, and the 
payments thereunder, are inseparable from the 
surface ownership because the Surface Owner's 
Agreement so operates as a matter of law, as 
appears from: 
(a) the recitals and legal background; 
(b) the provisions of the Agreement; and 
(c) the applicable rules of law. 
-11-
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(a) Recitals and legal background. 
The purpose of the Surface Owner's Agreement is best 
seen against the background of its formal preliminary recitals 
and the general law those recitals invoke* The recitals ares 
that the Newton Company owns the described property subject to 
a prior reservation of the minerals by Union Pacific Railroad 
Company? that Champlin has succeeded to the ownership of the 
oil and gas title? and that Champlin proposes entry upon the 
surface by it or its lessee for oil and gas purposes* 
This recital of the earlier severance of the mineral 
title from the surface title invokes the general legal 
consequence that severance vests some right of surface use in 
the mineral owner,, either express or implied* This Court has 
stated the general relationship of the respective rights to be 
as followss 
The general rule which is approved by all 
jurisdictions that have considered the matter is that 
the ownership (or rights of a lessee) of mineral 
rights in land is dominant over the rights of the 
owner of the fee to the extent reasonably necessary to 
extract the minerals therefrom* This dominance is 
limited in that the mineral owner may exercise that 
right only as reasonably necessary for that purpose
 { 
and consistent with allowing the fee owner the 
greatest possible use of his property consistent 
therewith. 
Flying Diamond v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) 
i (citations omitted). 
Some potential for disagreement between the respective 
owners as to what is reasonably necessary is inherent in this 
situation, and this subject is treated in a recent, lengthy 
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annotation, Oil and Gas - Necessary Use of Surface, 53 A.L.R.3d 
16, 16-174. The introduction states (53 A.L.R.3d at 24): 
This annotation deals with some aspects of the 
"age-old battle between a surface owner and mineral 
owner as to their respective rights" in the surface of 
the premises embraced by the mineral lease* Of all 
questions that beset the lessee-lessor relationship, 
none surpasses that of surface user and the resulting 
surface damages; thus, there is a "voluminous 
reservoir of law concerning the use of the surface by 
a lessee under the terms of an oil and gas lease." 
[Citations omitted]. 
The annotator analyzes many cases deciding whether a 
particular surface use by the oil and gas operator is 
actionable, as being not reasonably necessary in the 
circumstances. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 
(Utah 1976), cited above, illustrates the problem and is 
discussed in the annotation (p. 4, Pocket Supp. 1982). 
A footnote to the annotation (53 A.L.R.3d at 25, n.10) 
quotes Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 
Land and Water L. Rev. 49, 50 (1970), about the practicalities 
of the surface-mineral conflict: 
The same writer has humorously pointed out that 
"if the meadows were wet and now badly rutted, and his 
mineral interest is nil anyway, then quicker than can 
be muttered fApplication for Temporary Injunction,1 
the client will demand the balm of instant legal 
redress and damages as an alternative to his itchy 
shotgun trigger finger." 
The persuasive power of surface occupiers1 itchy 
trigger fingers may be seen in the fact that they have 
been able in many areas to obtain compensation for 
surface or "location" damages which they well may not 
have had legal right to recover, but which have been 
paid by oil and gas producers as a matter of 
policy. . . . 
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Before the Surface Ownerss Agreement was entered into, 
the relationship of the respective surface rights of the owners 
of the mineral and surface estates in the Newton Sheep Ranch 
held the potential difficulties discussed in the annotation* 
The Agreement was written against that general legal 
background* The testimony of Champlin's veteran land manager 
about the general purpose of the Agreement, and the purpose of 
the inseparability provisions, quoted above, show that the 
practical business objective is to obviate problems of the kind 
detailed in the cited annotation, on a continuing basis. 
The essence of the Agreement lies in the 
inseparability provisions, the exchanged promises of the Newton 
Company and Champlin that during the term of the Agreement the 
payment covenants will not be separated from the surface 
ownership. If the Newton Company's inseparability promises 
could be ignored unilaterally, the relation between the surface 
and mineral estates would revert to what it was before the 
Agreement was signed. The Agreement's purpose would be 
thwartedo 
(b) The provis ions of Surface Owner's Agreement 
determine the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of the payment 
covenants and the monies payable thereunder 
as a matter of law. 
The Surface Owner's Agreement provides , as c l e a r l y as 
language can convey meaning, t ha t the surface payment 
covenants , and the proceeds, can not be separated from the 
surface ownership. 
- 1 1 -
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Section 7 states the parties1 agreement concerning 
". . . the covenants to pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3, 
and 5 hereof [i.e., all three payment covenants]" as follows: 
Such covenants ". . . shall be covenants running 
with the surface ownership"; 
The covenants ". . • shall not be held . . . 
separately [from the surface ownership]"; 
The covenants ". . . shall not be . . . 
transferred separately [from the surface ownership]"; 
and 
". • . any sums payable under this Agreement shall be 
paid to the person or persons owning the surface of 
the described premises as of the date the oil and gas 
or associated liquid hydrocarbon production is 
marketed;" a "subsequent purchaser of the described 
premises" is entitled to the payments upon showing a 
chain of title to "such ownership," 
(Emphasis added). 
Apart from this language, other specially drafted 
provisions reinforce the agreed inseparability. These are: 
.(!)• The successors-and-assigns provision. Section 10 
permits either party to assign the agreement; its benefits and 
burdens extend to successors and assigns. This standard 
provision, however, is here expressly agreed to be "[s]ubject 
to the provisions of Section 7." 
Section 7 s tates the inseparability provisions. The 
surface ownership and the covenants thus are transferrable, but 
only simultaneously and only to the same successor owner. 
Section 10 also precludes the separated transfer the 
Bass-Newton parties say they attempted. 
-15-
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(2) Identical handling of all payment covenants. 
Section 7 accords identical attributes to all the easement 
payment covenants (the 2 1/2% payment; the acreage rental; and 
the damage payments) t in the same terms, all are agreed to be 
inseparable from the surface title* 
The inherent content of the covenant to reimburse 
damages to the Ranch surface is such that that covenant could 
not be transferred to another ranch property without destroying 
its meaning, nor could it with any logic be transferred in 
gross* The covenant to pay acreage rents is, in the same way, 
inseparable from this Ranch surface; to attempt to move it to 
another property would deprive it of any content, nor could it 
well be transferred in gross. The fact that the 2 1/2% 
covenant is treated in the same terms as the other two 
covenants shows the original parties1 recognition that that 
covenant is also by its nature inseparable from this Ranch 
surface so long as the Agreement endures* , 
(3) Reciprocal nature of exchanged covenants* The 
easement benefits granted by Sec* 1 are for Champlin's use in 
connection with its oil and gas estate, and they continue for \ 
the benefit of successor owners of the oil and gas estate (Sec* 
8 ) ; the easement burdens encumber the surface in the hands of 
"present and future owners" of the surface (Sec* 8)* Being < 
appurtenances to this oil and gas title, Champlin could not 
unilaterally deed the easement title to the owner of another 
mineral section, nor could it use the easements in operations 1 
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upon other mineral sections of its own. The easement benefits 
and burdens are inseparable from the described property for the 
limited life of this oil and gas project, and it is inherent in 
this pattern that the compensating payments are likewise tied 
to the described property for the life of the project* 
(4) Match of surface payments to surface burdens* 
Each of the easement payment covenants is so written that the 
amount of each recurring payment is adjustable, according to 
the degree of burden compensated: the acreage rental 
adjustment takes account of the area occupied and its ranching 
value; the surface damage payments match the damage caused; the 
2 1/2% payment automatically varies in direct proportion with 
the intensity of production and marketing* This 
self-adjustment also operates in respect to timing, so that the 
separate remittances are payable when the particular easement 
burden is felt. Finally, the right to the individual payments 
is vested by the Agreement in the person affected by the 
impacts of the easements, the surface owner at the time. This 
fundamentally fair matching of payment to burden underlies the 
economic sense of the Agreement and explains why it precludes 
the alienation of severed fractions of the easement payment 
covenant. 
(c) Applicable rules of real property law and 
contract law. 
The i n i t i a l theory of Bass and the Newtons was that 
the roya l ty described in the Deed was the 2 1/2% easement 
-17 -
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payment i n t e r e s t* The r e a l property theory was l a t e r 
disclaimed in favor of the theory tha t the case involves only a 
con t rac tua l assignment of monies paid and to be paid by 
Champlin. The course of t h i s sh i f t of pos i t ion is de t a i l ed in 
Point Ve 
Plying Diamond submits tha t the 2 1/2% easement 
payment covenant i s , as the p a r t i e s who created i t ca l l ed i t , a 
"covenant running with the surface owner ship , ' 1 and tha t 
quest ions concerning i t s inc idents are governed by r ea l 
property law and not con t rac t law. In the event , he r e , the 
ru l e s of both bodies of law lead to the same r e s u l t . 
This br ie f analyzes the l ega l nature of the 2 1/2% 
easement payment covenant, and the t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y of the 
covenant and i t s proceeds, in terms of r e a l property law and 
also the ru les of assignment developed in the law of c o n t r a c t s . 
(1) Real Property P r i n c i p l e s . 
The Surface Ownerfs Agreement provides (Section 7)
 ( 
t h a t a l l of the payment covenants are "covenants running with 
the surface ownership." 
A basic textbook, 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real < 
Proper ty , H 673 [ 1 ] , pp. 60-35 to 60-38 (1981) (footnotes 
omi t ted) , s t a t e s with respect to the running of covenants; 
[1] General ly. Covenants are e i t h e r pe rsona l , < 
tha t i s they are enforceable only by the o r i g i n a l 
covenantee, or they "run with the land ." The 
difference hinges upon whether the o r i g i n a l 
covenanting p a r t i e s 1 r espec t ive r i g h t s or du t i e s can 
devolve upon t he i r successors . The covenantee 's 
r i g h t s are known as the "benef i t" while the 1 
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covenantor's duties are known as the "burden." When 
certain requirements are met, the benefit or the 
burden runs with the land to the covanantee's or the 
covenantor's successors. 
The concept of covenants running with the land 
evolved from two separate lines of cases. The first 
line of cases began with the decision of an English 
court in Spencerfs Case, where the plaintiff 
unsuccessfully brought suit at law to recover damages 
for breach of covenant. This line of cases thus 
concerns the running of covenants at law, or so-called 
"real covenants." Another English decision, in 1848, 
Tulk v. Moxhay, enjoined the breach of a covenant in 
equity, beginning a line of cases dealing with the 
running of covenants in equity, referred to in this 
Treatise as "equitable restrictions." 
Different requirements have developed for the 
running of real covenants and the running of equitable 
restrictions. The elements most often said to be 
required for covenants to run at law are that: (1) 
the covenant "touch and concern" the land; (2) the 
original covenanting parties intend the covenant to 
run; and (3) there be some form of privity of estate. 
A fourth requirement, that the covenant be in writing, 
is also sometimes mentioned. For covenants to run in 
equity, courts require that: (1) the covenant "touch 
and concern" the land; (2) the original covenanting 
parties intend the covenant to run; and (3) the 
successor to the burden have "notice" of the 
covenant. 
Powell also shows that a running covenant is an 
interest in land, for Statute of Frauds purposes. (Id. fl 671, 
ppo 60-14 to 60-15). 
The rule recognized in the general law of contracts is 
that if a covenant runs with land and is not merely personal, 
it is to be construed and enforced in accordance with rules of 
real property law. The principles of contract law do not 
necessarily apply. Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 
316(2)(1981). Comment b. to § 316 of the Contracts Restatement 
explains: 
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The law r e l a t i n g to covenants in conveyances and 
leases of land grew up as a pa r t of the law of r ea l 
property and i s l e f t to the Restatement, Second, of 
Proper ty . 
All elements mentioned by Powell as being required for 
the running of the benef i t of the 2 1/2% covenant, both a t law 
and in equi ty ("touch and concern," i n t e n t , p r i v i t y , not ice) 
appear in the present cases 
"Touch and concern." Powell s t a t e s Ud. fl 673 [ 2 ] [ a ] , 
pp. 60-40 to 60-41) (footnotes omi t ted) : 
The ru l e tha t a covenant cannot run with the land 
a t law or in equity i f i t i s only i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t ed 
to the land was derived from d ic ta in Spencer fs Case. 
Known as the "touch and concern" requirement, the ru le 
r e t a i n s force today, although i t has been g r e a t l y 
re laxed. The touch and concern requirement i s the 
only e s s e n t i a l for the running of covenants which 
focuses on an object ive analys is of the contents of 
the covenant i t s e l f ra ther than the in t en t ions of and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the p a r t i e s . 
The majority of cour ts and w r i t e r s now accept the 
t e s t for the "touching and concerning of covenants" 
proposed by Dean Harry Bigelow, an eminent au thor i ty 
on the subject of covenants. Dean Bigelow said tha t 
if the covenantor ' s l ega l i n t e r e s t in land i s rendered 
l e s s valuable by the c o v e n a n t s performance, then the 
burden of the covenant s a t i s f i e s the requirement tha t 
the covenant touch and concern land. If, on the other 
hand, the covenantee 's l ega l i n t e r e s t in land i s 
rendered more valuable by the covenant ' s performance, 
then the benef i t of the covenant s a t i s f i e s the 
requirement tha t the covenant touch and concern land . 
[Footnotes omi t t ed ] . 
The textbook c i t e s as examples of running r e a l 
covenants "payments for the use of an easement." Id .^ 1f 675 
[ 2 ] [ a ] , pp. 60-89 to 60-90. That i s t h i s case . Powel l ' s 
ana lys is shows (Id. fl 675 [2 ] [ a ] , pp. 60-89 to 60-92) t h a t an 
aff i rmat ive covenant to pay meets the "touch and concern" t e s t 
where the underlying purpose is benef i t to covenantor ' s own 
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l and . Here, t h e exchange of easement for covenanted payments 
c l e a r l y benef i t s (and burdens) each affected e s t a t e . Touch and 
concern inheres d i r e c t l y in each e s t a t e in the land, and is not 
merely c o l l a t e r a l . 
In t en t element. The p a r t i e s to the Surface Owner's 
Agreement expressly s t a t ed tha t the 2 1/2% payment covenant 
would run with the surface ownership and t h i s , according to 
Powell Ud. l 673[2][b] , p . 60-51), "should normally be 
dec is ive" as to the i n t en t element. 
P r i v i t y . Various kinds of pri v i ty have been required 
in the cases for the running of a covenant benef i t ("mutual™ -
simultaneous i n t e r e s t s in same land; "hor izonta l" - connected 
with a conveyance; and " v e r t i c a l " - succession to affected 
e s t a t e ) . These are discussed a t length by Powell. Id . II 
673[2] [c ] , pp. 60-57 to 60-68. I t I s el ear for present 
purposes tha t the grant of the appurtenant surface easement in 
exchange for the covenanted payments, and Flying Diamond's 
succession in t i t l e to the covenantee 's surface e s t a t e , c r ea t e 
such p r i v i t y as is su f f i c i en t to meet any and a l l of the t e s t s . 
Notice. The recordat ion of the Surface Owners 
Agreement s a t i s f i e s the not ice requirement. 
The consequence of the determination tha t the 2 1/2% 
covenant benef i t runs with the surface ownership is tha t when 
the e s t a t e with which i t runs i s l a t e r conveyed (here, the 
surface ir
 :r * -i, *;; Diamond) the benef i t necessar i ly passes 
as a pa r t ;: the e s t a t e conveyed. 
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Real covenants are sometimes encountered in oil and 
gas conveyancing. The surface covenants involved here are, in 
their nature, similar to the standard "free gas" covenant 
(lesseefs promise that the surface owner shall have gas, if 
available, at his residence on the property, without cost)« 
The free-gas covenant has consistently been held to be a 
covenant running with the surface ownership, the benefit of 
which accrues automatically to the successor surface owner. 
Justice v. Pennzoil Co., 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979)i Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732, 
594 P.2d 177 (1979)? Patrick v. Allen, 350 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 
1961)? Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Huffman, 376 P.2d 599 (Okla. 
1962)(by implication)? Annot., 79 A.L.R. 496, 502 (1932). 
By operation of accepted real property principles, the 
grant of the Ranch surface title by Newton Sheep to Flying 
Diamond carried with it (by operation of law, as well as by the 
express covenant terms) the benefits of these payment covenants 
and the right to enforce them? the grant also divested Newton 
Sheep of all such benefits and rights. The rule is stated in 
II American Law of Property, § 9*19 (1952): 
While the original covenantee retains the 
benefited land, he alone may sue to enforce the 
covenant either upon the basis of privity of contract 
or upon privity of estate• But when he has 
transferred his entire estate in the benefited land, 
the benefit has run to the assignee, and the latter 
alone can enforce the privity of estate basis of 
liability since the original covenantee no longer has 
any ownership of the benefited estate. Likewise, the 
assignee is also the only one who can enforce the 
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privity of contract liability* This is on the theory 
that the contract right is impliedly assigned with the 
benefited landr so as to pass with the benefit to the 
assignee. 
(2) Principles of Contract Law. 
If the problem presented by this case is analyzed in 
terms of the rules of contract law, the result is the same as 
that stated above. An assignment of fractional interests in 
the 2 1/2% payment interest, or an assignment of the individual 
payments accruing from time to t ,ime, cannot be given any legal 
effect. The Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 317(2)(1981) 
(emphasis added), states: 
(2) A contractual right can be assigned unless 
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee 
for the right of the assignor would materially change 
the duty of the obligor, or materially increase the 
burden of risk imposed on him by his contract, or 
materially impair his chance of obtaining return 
performance, or materially reduce its value to him, or 
(b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or is 
otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy, or 
(c) assignment is validly precluded by contract. 
Both underlined exceptions to * 317f2) are 
applicable. No contractual right to the 2 1/2% payment can be 
assigned. Subsection (c) applies because an assignment in 
gross of fractions of the covenant, or the recurring money 
payments, is precluded by contract provisions which forbid 
separate transfer and separate holding, and whLch vest the 
right of payment in the person who owns the surface when the 
individual remittance falls due. Subsection (a) applies 
because a diversion of remittances to a stranger to the surface 
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title would materially "reduce the value" to Champlin of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement* The purpose of the Agreement would 
be thwarted, as discussed in Point 1(a). 
The Bass-Newton assignment theory fails for an 
additional reason, founded in the language the parties used in 
the Deed* Even if the Deed could be read as if it were an 
assignment of future remittances, and even if the supposed 
assignment were not otherwise precluded, the Deed language 
would transfer only those payments to which the Grantor is 
"entitled" when the payment is due* The underlying condition 
is Newton Sheep's "entitlement" to the remittancef and this 
terminated upon its sale of the Ranch surface by operation of 
the very instrument creating the remittance obligation* The 
subject of assignment of conditional rights is treated in 
Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 320 (1981)* It is there 
said that a conditional right can be assigned before the 
condition occurs, and that "the assignee's right is subject to < 
the same conditions as was the assignor's*" Icl. Comment c* 
Thus, A can validly assign his future wages at X Company, but 
if he later resigns his employment the assignee has no claim < 
upon the wages of X Company's next employee* The principle 
further defeats respondents' alternative theory* 
Point II* Practical construction of the Surface { 
Owner's Agreement by the parties 
shows that the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant is inseparable from the surface 
ownership* 
• i 
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As shown above, the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant 
and the accruing payments are as a matter of law inseparable 
from the surface title. This point can be validated through 
examination of the parties1 actions pursuant to the Surface 
Owner's Agreement. 
Some years before production, Champlin accepted Newton 
Sheepf s showing of its sucession to the surface title and toe: >k 
some care to advise Newton Sheep that the payments under the 
2 1/2% covenant are inseparable from the surface ownership. 
(Exh. 9 at R 521), Later, Champlin accepted Flying Diamond's 
proof of its surface ownership. Champlin began monthly 
payments to Flying Diamond, as surface owner, when oil and gas 
marketing commenced. Champlin continued these surface payments 
notwithstanding that it was apprised of this suit when 
pre-trial discovery involved its personnel, and continues to do 
so to the present time. 
'Flying Diamond, by acts, construed the Agreement 
identically. Before production was obtained, Flying Diamond 
advised Champlin of its acquisition of the surface ownership. 
Flying Diamond has routinely accepted the 2 1/2% payments as 
its own. Upon the Newton demand to participate, it brought 
this action to declare its right to the covenant benefits. 
Newton Sheep itself earlier submitted proof of its 
acquisition of surface title to Champlin for purposes of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement, (Exhs. 9 at R 521, 1 0 at R 523). 
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Similarly/ although Bass and the Newtons now assert 
t ha t the i r ac t ions e f f ec t i ve ly separated the covenant payment 
from the surface t i t l e , t he i r conduct shows a most p r a c t i c a l 
recogni t ion of inseparab i l i ty* The Deed, drafted by Bass, was 
prepared within a month or two af ter Newton Sheep had been 
fu l ly advised by Champlin about the i n sepa rab i l i t y provis ions 
of Section 7 . The Deed warrants the one-half mineral t i t l e in 
the fee lands? in c o n t r a s t , the purported royal ty grant in the 
Railroad lands operates only to the extent t ha t Newton Sheep i s 
"en t i t l ed*" The qu i t - c l a im nature of the second grant 
recognizes the s e v e r a b i l i t y problem, then further addresses i t 
in the second paragraph of Subparagraph B . , which provides* 
In addi t ion to the spec i f i c warrant ies of 
paragraph IV hereof, the Grantor , as a r ea l covenant, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y covenants tha t the i n t e r e s t conveyed in 
t h i s subparagraph Bo c o n s t i t u t e s a mutual covenant 
running with the land described on Exhibi t WBW, and 
a l l successive future owners of the i n t e r e s t conveyed 
under the provis ions of t h i s subparagraph B. , s h a l l 
have the r i g h t to invoke and enforce i t s provis ions as 
the o r i g i n a l s igners the re to • 
The two covenants Newton Sheep here makes concerning the 
f r ac t i ona l roya l ty i t has purportedly severed and conveyed to a 
grantee owning no other i n t e r e s t in the Railroad l ands , are (a) 
t h a t the roya l ty runs with the Railroad l ands , and (b) t h a t i t 
does not run but i s enforceable in gross by a l l f r ac t iona l 
successor roya l ty owners. The covenants con t rad ic t each 
o the r . Newton Sheep's breach i s b u i l t in« Bass can have i t s 
money back if it chooses* 
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Practical construction is ". • . entitled to great, if 
not controlling influence" in ascertaining contract meaning. 
17 Am* Jur. 2dr Contracts, § 274 (1964)• The actions of all 
the parties show recognition, in practice, that the benefit of 
the covenant payments is inherent in the surface title. 
Point III. The trial court improperly admitted 
extrinsic evidence? evidence of the 
"intent" of the parties to the Deed is 
immaterial because the earlier Surface 
Owner's Agreement is without ambiguity and 
is dispositive. 
Before trial, Plying Diamond submitted a motion for 
partial summary judgment based on the theory that the 
unambiguous provisions of the Surface Ownerfs Agreement 
determine the case, This motion was renewed at trial and an 
objection was made to the admission of any extrinsic evidence. 
These motions were denied and the objection was overruled. It 
is argued mi this point that the rulings were erroneous, 
The rule in Utah governing deed construction was 
stated in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) 
(footnotes ommitted) (emphasis in original), as follows: 
This Court has long recognized the cardinal rule 
of deed construction that the intention of the parties 
as drawn from the whole deed must govern. 
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of 
deeds is a question of law for the court, and the main 
object in construing a deed is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties, especially that of the 
grantor, from the language used. The description of 
the property in a deed is prima facie an expression of 
the intention of the grantor and the term Mintention," 
as applied to the construction of a deed, is to be 
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dis t inguished from i t s usual connotat ion. When so 
appl ied , i t i s a term of a r t and s i g n i f i e s a meaning 
of the wr i t i ng . 
Deeds are to be construed l i k e other wri t ten 
inst ruments , and where a deed is p la in and 
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary 
i t s termsc I t i s the c o u r t ' s duty to construe a deed 
as i t i s w r i t t e n , and in the f ina l a n a l y s i s , each 
instrument must be construed in the l i g h t of i t s own 
language and pecul iar f ac t s • I t i s a lso well known 
tha t the in ten t ion of the p a r t i e s to a conveyance i s 
open to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n only when the words used are 
ambiguous. 
The same ru l e is expressed in Ash v. S t a t e , 572 P.2d 1374, 1379 
(Utah 1977) (footnote omitted) ("The deed i s c lear and 
unambiguous. When the in ten t ion of the p a r t i e s can be 
ascer ta ined from the words used in the deed, there remains 
nothing to ef fec tuate tha t intention.8 8) 
I t i s apparent from a reading of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement, and increas ing ly apparent on r e - r ead ings , t h a t the 
instrument was prepared with as much care as can be brought to 
l ega l draf t ing work. The Agreement i s without ambiguity. I t s 
provis ions operate as a matter of law and requ i re a judgment in 
Flying Diamond's favor• 
If the Agreement so opera tes , evidence preferred by 
Bass and the Newtons about the subjec t ive i n t en t behind the i r 
l a t e r Deed i s not m a t e r i a l . I t could not matter t ha t they may 
have intended an at tempt a t a t ransfer of an i n t e r e s t in the 
2 1/2% payment covenant because they could not have done so . 
Point IV. The 2 1/2% payment covenant i s not a " royal ty 
(of any t y p e ) , " and therefore the Deed from 
Newton Sheep to Bass did not g r an t , or r e s e r v e , 
any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n . 
- 2 8 -
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I n i t i a l l y , the case presented by Bass and the Newtons 
was based on the theory tha t the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant i s a roya l ty , and tha t the "royal ty (of any type) " 
language of the Bass-Newton Deed granted one-half, and reserved 
one-half, of the i n t e r e s t . The case was briefed on the roya l ty 
theory. A memorandum f i l ed by Bass argues: 
A. The 2 1/2% payment by Champlin is a royal ty 
and ass ignable : — The 2 1/2% share in the production 
from o i l an gas granted to the Newtons is a 
nonpar t ic ipa t ing royal ty carved out of the o i l and gas 
e s t a t e by the owner (Champlin) in favor of a th i rd 
party (the Newtons). This type of roya l ty i s ca l l ed 
"non-par t ic ipa t ing" because i t does not include 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in bonuses or delay r e n t a l s and because 
i t c a r r i e s no r i g h t to lease or to produce the o i l and 
gas [ c i t a t i o n s omi t t ed ] . 
A nonpar t ic ipa t ing roya l ty may be created by 
g ran t , as he re , or by reserva t ion e i the r before or 
a f t e r a mineral lease is issued. The roya l ty in t h i s 
case i s a present vested incorporeal i n t e r e s t in the 
o i l and gas e s t a t e and in the production therefrom. 
(Memorandum . . . In Support of [Bass fs] Motion for 
Summary Judgment; R 126-7). 
At t r i a l , the Bass-Newton p a r t i e s sought to prove 
i n t e n t tha t the roya l ty grant conveyed the 2 1/2% payment: the 
C o l l i s t e r testimony was wholly d i rec ted to that po in t . The 
f indings and conclusions submitted by the Bass-Newton p a r t i e s 
to the lower court r e f l e c t s the royal ty theory. The bas ic 
findings r e c i t e such an in t en t and the conclusions are tha t the 
conveyances effected the t ransfer of "the 2 1/2% payment" 
i n t e r e s t (Findings 6, 9; Conclusions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 ) . 
'A theo re t i ca l di f f i cu l ty wi th all t h i s l i e s i n the '• 
premise tha t the "2 1/2% payment" i s a " roya l ty" : i f as a 
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l ega l matter i t i s not a roya l ty (a term having a technical 
meaning) a subs t an t i a l problem of law i s ra i sed as to whether 
the Deed conveyed i t . This may well have prompted the 
p o s t - t r i a l disavowal of the roya l ty theory by the Bass-Newton 
p a r t i e s . 
''Royalty* i s defined by Williams & Meyers (H. Williams 
and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms, 656 (5th ede 1981)) as 
fol lows: 
(1) The landowner's share of product ion, f ree of 
expenses of product ion. 
(2) A share of product ion, f ree of expenses of 
production, e . g . , an Overriding Royalty (q.v.) of 1/8 of 
the 7/8 working i n t e r e s t* 
The Hornbook (R. Hemingway, Oil and Gas, § 2 .7(C), p . 
52 (1971)) s t a t e s : 
In the vas t majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s a grant 
or rese rva t ion of a " roya l ty" i n t e r e s t w i l l be 
in te rp re ted as c rea t ing a non-cost bearing i n t e r e s t 
t ha t w i l l share only in a f rac t iona l port ion of gross 
product ion, and wi l l not p a r t i c i p a t e in bonus, delay 
r e n t a l s , or the power to l e a s e . 
In a few j u r i s d i c t i o n s , notably Oklahoma, the 
term " roya l ty" i s t r ea ted as being uncertain in 
meaning and circumstances surrounding the t r ansac t ion 
w i l l bear on the supposed i n t en t of the p a r t i e s . 
Generally speaking, a grant of a " royal ty" i n t e r e s t a t 
a time when no lease i s in ex i s tence w i l l be construed 
as denoting a fu l ly p a r t i c i p a t i n g mineral es ta te? 
however, i f a l ease i s in e f f ec t i n t en t w i l l be 
construed as ind ica t ing an i n t e r e s t t ha t wi l l share 
only in gross production. I t i s submitted t h a t a 
treatment of the term "royal ty" as uncertain in 
meaning i s unsound. 
These standard d e f i n i t i o n s of " royal ty" have i t in 
common tha t the term connotes a property i n t e r e s t j^n the o i l 
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and gas. As shown above, Bass itself so argued to the trial 
court. (R 126-7). 
Bassfs position that the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant is a "nonparticipating royalty" which was "carved out" 
of Champlin's oil and gas estate in favor of the Newtons and is 
"a present vested incorporeal interest in the oil and gas 
estate/' is plainly incorrect. The 2 1/2% payment is not a 
royalty in any standard legal sense. Moreover, and more 
important here, Bass's assertion is flatly contradicted by 
Section 4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement: "Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed as , , , a grant to Land Owner of 
oil or gas rights or rights in other associated liquid 
hydrocarbons." (R 480; Exh. 1). 
Since Newton Sheep, as successor in interest under the 
Surface Owner's Agreement, di d not owi I a royalty i n the 
railroad lands, its quitclaim of a royalty therein to Bass had 
no effect. 
Point V. The Final Judgment is erroneous because it is 
based on a theory of the case (that the Deed is 
an "assignment" of money proceeds) for which 
there is no support in the evidence or the 
findings and conclusions, and which is contrary 
to the Bass-Newton evidenceo 
''.••' As detailed above, the Bass-Newton case was 
essentially briefed and tried on the theory that the royalty 
grant to Bass conveyed a fractional interest in the 2 1/2% 
easement payment covenant. The record reflects, however, that 
in the course of the matter the alternative theory developed 
that the Deed is an "assignment" of money proceeds. The 
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opening statement of Bass refers to the theory (Tr 54). After 
findings and conclusions were entered (based on the royalty 
theory), the Bass-Newton parties apparently abandoned their 
royalty theory in favor of the assignment theory* 
The second position is stated in the Memorandum Of 
Bass
 c • • In Response To Plaintifffs Motions (R 419-20): 
It appears that plaintiff [Plying Diamond] sees 
the case from an entirely different point of view than 
do the Newtons and Bass, One would assume from the 
plaintiff's argument that this case is concerned with 
an effort to sever a property interest from the 
surface title, or to sever and transfer fractional 
interests in real property, or to assign a covenant, 
or to alter the bargain between Champlin and the 
Newtons or to assign a contractual right. This case 
is none of these things* . . . 
* * * * 
The question before the court is whether 
interests in the proceeds of an obligation to pay 
money are assignable. Nothing has been offered by 
plaintiff to show that a money obligation cannot be 
dealt with in such a manner. 
The consequence of abandonment of the royalty theory 
is that it leaves the Final Judgment without support. The 
language of the Deed itself does not support it. None of the 
trial evidence supports the assignment theory; indeed, to the 
extent that the Bass evidence touches the subject matter it 
contradicts the assignment theory. 
The Deed is not, nor does it purport to be, an 
assignment of the monies paid and to be paid by Champlin* On 
its face it is a present conveyance by a grantor to a grantee 
of a fractional royalty interest in described lands, 
i 
accompanied by such standard real estate elements as a further 
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assurances covenant, warranty provisions, and a preferential 
right of purchase of minerals and royalty reserved to the 
grantor (treating them identically). 
Bass's trial effort was wholly taken up trying to 
prove that the Deedss intent was to convey a fractional royalty 
interest. No witness testified that the Deed was intended to 
be an assignment of monies. 
Bass's conveyancer testified that he considered the 
2 1/2% covenant to be a royalty and that the Deed he prepared 
was Intended * > convey that royalty (Deposition of Collister (R 
527), pp. 22, 25, 48, 49), conceding the obvious that 
"probably11 the royalty grant would operate only upon what the 
grantor was entitled to grant (p. 36, lines 4-9). 
The testimony of Mr. Collister precludes the new 
theory that the Deed can be read as i f :i t were a contractual 
assignment of money proceeds. The witness said he employed 
words of grant sufficient to convey property in Utah 
(Deposition, p. 34), and that ". * . my deed paragraph A 
conveys minerals, and paragraph B conveys royalty" (Deposition, 
p. 49, lie 6- 7 [emphasis added]). He took care to note the. 
existence of the basic legal distinction between mineral and 
royalty (p, 49, 1. 7) then went on to say that other kinds of 
interests al so exists "No, there are other things clearly. 
The contractual right to receive monies, you know.111 (p. 49, 
11. 22-24 (emphasis added)). 
The record made by the Bass-Newton parties by their 
sole witness thus is that their Deed was intended to convey 
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royalty if it could, and that "royalty" differs in kind from 
"minerals" and from the "contractual right to receive monies*" 
This record is fatal to the late-adopted-assignment theory** 
The Judgment, founded as it is on a legal after-
thought, is erroneous because it is unsupported by any evidence 
or by the findings and conclusions, and because it is contrary 
to the evidence*. 
Point VI* Estoppel by deed, arising out of the Surface 
Ownerfs Agreement, precludes any claim by the 
Newtons or Bass to the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant or the monies accruing thereunder 
The Newtons (and their privy, Bass) are precluded from 
claims upon the benefit of the payment covenants by the bar of 
estoppel by deed* 
The Surface Owner Vs Agreement consists essentially of 
the Newton Company8s grant of the surface easements and, in 
consideration thereof, Champlin's payment covenants* The 
Newton Company agrees that the payment covenants run with, and 
are not to be held or transferred separately from, the surface 
ownership• The Newtons and Bass now claim, to the contrary, 
that they have transferred and now hold fractional benefits in 
the covenant interest separately from the surface ownership* 
Estoppel by deed precludes the second assertion* The principle 
is stated in 28 Am* Jur* 2d, Estoppel And Waiver, § 4 (1966) 
(footnotes omitted)s 
The principle is that when a man has entered into 
a solemn engagement by deed, he shall not be permitted 
to deny any matter which he has asserted therein, for 
a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law 
gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker; 
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to him it stands for truth, and in every situation in 
which he may be placed with respect to it, it is true 
as to him. . 
Estoppel by deed is a very important aspect of 
the law of estoppel. By reason of the operation of 
this doctrine, particularly upon grantors of real 
property and upon the passage of after-acquired title 
of such grantors, the effect of the doctrine upon 
grantees, and the effect and extent of control of 
recitals in conveyances as an estoppel upon parties 
thereto and their privies, many important and 
practical questions affecting the title to real 
property are controlled to a large extent* . . . 
' Estoppel by deed is particularly appropriate where, as 
here, the document is recorded in the land records of '" 
County: 
A person who is examining the record title to 
realty should be able to rely on the doctrine of 
estoppel by deed, without the necessity of having to 
investigate the possibility of a personal obligation 
to pay a money debt which might offset the estoppel by 
deed. 
Id. Moreover, this estoppel operates with special force because 
of the Newton Company's declaration in the Surface Ownerfs 
Agreement that all of the payment covenants, incli ldino he 2 
1/2% payment, are Mcovenants running with the surface 
ownership" of the Ranch: 
Estoppels which run with the land and work 
thereon are not mere conclusions; they pass estates 
a n d
 constitute titles, and are muniments of title, 
assuring it to the purchaser. 
Id. § 8 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). 
•".The estoppel precludes any Bass and Newton, assert! oris 
of fractional titles in the 2 1/2% covenant interest. Further, 
since equity will not permit a result to be worked indirectly 
if that result is directly prohibited, Bass and the Newtons are 
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also estopped from claiming an interest in individual money 
remittances falling due under the easement payment covenant. 
Point VIIc The lower court's Conclusion (Noc 7) that 
"Flying Diamond is estopped to deny that it 
has only a one-fourth interest in the 2 1/2% 
payment1* is erroneous, in thats 
(a) no evidence supports it? and 
(b) the documents provide otherwise. 
Conclusion No* 7 reflects acceptance by the lower 
court of an estoppel contention advanced in Bassfs Trial 
Memorandum (R 363-5)• The conclusion is based on Finding No* 9 
that it was Flying Diamondfs wintentw to acquire wone-fourth" 
of the "2 1/2% payment.11 The theory of the claimed estoppel is 
that when Flying Diamond bought the Ranch surface it also 
bought one-half of the "royalty (of any type)w then held by 
Newton Sheep; and that by intentionally and knowingly 
purchasing a one-fourth interest in the royalty. Flying Diamond 
is estopped from claiming a greater interest therein* Bass 
cited Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956); 
Dillon Inv. Co, v. Kinikin, 172 Kan. 523, 241 P.2d 493 (1952); 
and 28 Am. Jur. 2dF Estoppel and Waiver9 § 13 (1966). These 
authorities state the generalization that the grantee of a deed 
is estopped from accepting the benefits of a transaction while 
at the same time inconsistently rejecting the accompanying 
burdens. 
Since the Bass-Newton parties abandoned any claim upon 
the 2 1/2% covenant based on a real property theory of the 
-36-
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case, an estoppel by deed concept becomes irrelevant* Howeverr 
that may be, no estoppel of Flying Diamond exists here. 
The generalization mentioned above has no operation in 
this casee While the grant to Flying Diamond in the Ranch 
Purchase Contract was a warranted "full" title to the surface, 
it was a mere quitclaim of half the minerals then owned by 
Seller in the fee lands and a quitclaim of half of any royalty 
Seller ,fis entitled to receive" in the railroad lands. 
There is no inconsistency between the purchase in 1974 
of a warranted surface title together with a quit-claim of half 
of the Seller's railroad "royalty," if any, and Flying 
Diamond's present position that the grant of the surface 
incorporated all the burdens and benefits of the surface 
covenants and that the "royalty" quitclaim was, like that to 
Bass, ineffective. Flying Diamond's position is simply that 
the Ranch Purchase Contract applies in accordance with all of 
its terms. 
It is settled ] aw that a quitclaim wil 1 not gi ve rise* 
to an estoppel. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 9 
(1966). w [A] grantee . . . may deny that any estate or 
interest passed to him by a conveyance." I£. § 13. 
Further, Finding No. 9, on which the claimed estoppel 
restsf is unsupported. The trial record contains no extrinsic 
evidence whatever about Flying Diamond's subjective "intent." 
Only the document itself is in evidence, and the intent stated 
there is to acquire half the royalty, if any, that the Seller 
can grant. The failure of the Finding to reflect the 
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conditional (quitclaiming) nature of the parties1 "intent" is 
critical* Finding No* 9 is necessarily incorrect. Conclusion 
Noo 7 is therefore wrong because unsupported. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment below should be vacated* The case should 
be remanded with a direction to the court below to enter 
judgment in Flying Diamondfs favor declaring its ownership of 
the benefits of the 2 1/2% payment covenant, and its proceeds, 
free of any adverse claim of the Newtons or Bassf and to 
proceed with the disposition of the remaining issues of the 
litigationc 
DATED th is / 
d-
day of October, 1983, 
Respectfully submitted, 
Hardin A* Whitney 
John We Horsley 
H. Dennis Piercey 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C* 
Attorneys for Flying Diamond 
Oil Corporation 
Clifford Oe Stone, Jr« 
Katherine A. Zessin 
1700 Broadway, Suite 900 
Denver, Colorado 80290 
Counsel for Bow Valley 
Exploration (U.So) Inc* 
(Successor to Flying Diamond 
Oil Corporation) 
--*a-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
n4U 
I hereby certify that on the / — day of October, 1983, I 
served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellant by mailing a copy 
thereof in a securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the 
following: 
William J. Cayias 
CAYIAS, LIVINGSTON, & ^ MITH 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Newton Respondents 
Claron C. Spencer 
BEESLEY, SPENCER, & FAIRCLOOGH 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent Bass Enterprises 
Production Company 
/•/.L^L. /> 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\J A U V k 1J. XJ J. * o w w « • 
Rev. 8-16-71 
' . SURFACE OVfMER'S AGRWfriKi-iT-
{THIS AGRlvF.Mfc'.NT,- made and entered i n t o t h i s _ < ^ V / ; 
day of J> >.U*:,v'/P (..> , 1SLXL__> *by a n d between 
ItVUd- J . liV-.Tu;: L iX>;'vi;.:U:v COMv.XV, «•» I't-l-i cori-oiMLiosi, S.'U Ulc-e :: i L y, I i:>li 
(>.Gx'uinaftcr for convenience called the "Land Ov.'ner"), and CHAMPLIir 
PETROLEUM COMPANY (hereinafter for convenience called "Chojr.plin"); 
• . . . - ^ \ 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
RECITALS: .____ 
Land Ov/nor is the owner of the follov.-j.nrs described premises 
hereinafter referred to as "described premises": 
A l i of Soccionr. Sevan ( 7 ) , :'it\o (<)), F i f t e e n ( 1 3 ) , Seventeen ( 1 7 ) , >. i r.cUeen (I'O* 
and *\'wuntv-one (2L) , Vo-.-ii.'i'iin Tt:o (?) "or. l i , ;»<in;;<.' .Seven (V) •"..ast o i V.VJ S a l t 
l.j|;c i:usc Xoric! i«»n, Sirmit »:ountv, I'tah. . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:::^:ty •• J'- •...*•? - • * <; ; ; 
*SlXlt tJT/ however, t o ' e x c r e t i o n s and r e s e r v a t i o n s of: u n n c r a l s and rip.hus of *
 m 
g e n t r y und offsuri : . ice use con ta ined in ^ c e r t a i n deed o r deedr. o£ convevanco, 
* a s to l lovs t ' l ^K-r ran l iy . i)ord V.o. UVVl daved Si-pCewhor V.V , lc.M)6, fro::i Union l 'aci Lie 
• ' R a i l r o a d \:o:ao:uv/ .to . / i l l ir.:w Salmon, recorded I'.arch • ' : , ! 907 , in I'.ook 1 a t l-aj-e 31 ; 
^/ari%inCy ^iccd^i 'c . •"2{i7/ii chitoil August 2^ ,1909, i r o ' M nion j a e i f i c Uui l road ;;onpany I 
^ t o ' . i U S ^ o " ^ ! ! ^ ' ^ "V.S. '.Jondie and Thomas S. Conriic, recorded iVbruary 3 , 1 ^ ) 0 , in v 
§ l l o o ! c ^ J * ^ dated J u l y ?.:), 1909, from"Union . . / 
^ l # a c i f i c ^ : : a i l r o a d Cohnany to "av id Voff,~ 1/3 i n t e r a c t , Y>a"uieI %!eff, 1/3 i n t e r e s t , 
^•>n(l':Fx#cn!:!V;f.?'efk,': 1/3 i n t e r e s t , recorded Sen teube r 7 , l 9 ' i 0 , In r,ool:' ) a t l-a;;e i>7l; 
^ W a r r a n t y ^)oed; : ;o . 3^32 dated \ u f u s t i : 9 , l ° l O f i!ro-.t Vnion l a c i t i c Kai l road i:oiy>".ny 
^ to^Ucor^ l^ fv^uc tc l cn , v;.cor;f« ::. ::oddan and John J . Ircdden, recorded ScytecVor 13,191.0, 
^ U n ' ^ o ^ 3277 dated ^ r c l i .".,1910, vro.n l.nion 
§l Jaciflc5Xallrior*d*-Connahv Co ';oor;:o G# ••tiariden, C-eoiv.o C. hodden aivj John J . uo.dden, . 
' / rocordcsd^uViO; ' l6 # l9if t | in ?:ooi: J .»c;TiVo " l i 5 ; a l l in the nifi'ico of the 'Jounty . . . . 
^ C l c r k ^ a n d i ^ ,';' , i; • . • - : Vv-.# 
. v ^ < ^ 
a: 
• «;. i":'1V,J . . '?:-•'•*'•• 
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UJWJSGS-T^03*^^^ 
ights of entry and r^jxrr"nf% ^y-^^<^^"'nrrAr-\r->~ n c e r t a i n deed or 
- • • ^ - ^ * • 
ihamplin is' successor in interest to all the right, title, and 
.ntcrest of Union Pacific Railroad Company in anc] to*~the oil, . ' 
;a's, and associated liquid hydrocarbons in J^ i'cl premises for a 
;erm or period equal to or exceeding the-term of this Surface 
)v:ner!s Agreement. ...-< 
Champlin proposes for'Champlin or its agents, lessees, 
Licensees, successors, or assigns to prospect upon and explore 
the described premises ^0v the development and production of oil, 
5as, and assoc.in.tsd liquid hydrocarbon substances either on 
Champlin*£ behalf or under or pursuant to an oil and pas lease or 
14&Sflce, or under or pursuant to a "unitization agreement/1 meaning 
here and wherever that term is used herein any operating agreement, 
or any other agreement covering the exploration or development for 
or the production of oil, gas, or associated liquid hydrocarbons, 
or any pooling, co;:\;:;uniti/;ation, unit or other agreement whereby 
the described premises may be included with other lands in proximity 
thereto as a unit area under a plan of unit or joint exploration, 
development, and operation. 
ACKEEMEKT: "- - . 
• " NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as foliov/s: 
Section 1. In consideration of the mutual benefits and 
of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10) paid by Champlin to Land Owner, 
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, Land Owner hereby confirms, 
extends, and grants to Champlin, its agents, lessees, licensees, 
successors, and assigns, including any operator or unit operator 
from time to time in charge .of operations under a unitization 
agreement, and their respective successors and assigns, the casements 
and rights to enter upon the .described premises and to drill, con-
struct, maintain and use upon, within,* and over said premises all 
oil wells, gas wells, derricks, machinery, tanks, drips, boilers, 
engines, pipe, power and telephone lines, roadways, water wells, 
and, without limitation by reason of the foregoing enumeration, any 
and all other structures, equipment, fixtures, appurtenances, or 
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facilities (ail the above being included under the term "facilities") 
necessary or convenient in prospecting and developing for, producinp;, 
storing, transporting, and marketing oil, gas, and associated liquid *-
hydrocarbon substances under or produced from any portion of the -
,described premises or under or produced from any portion of the unit 
area created under a unitization agreement/ together with the right ..-/ 
/to remove said facilities and the right to use such v/ater as may be 
needed from the described premises, not including water from Land 
.. Owner1 s wells. 
• • . . * . 
* Section 2. Charr.plin agrees,, so long as it is receiving 
oil and/or gas production from or oil and/or pa5: royallies upon 
production from the described premises or allocated thereto under 
the provisions of a unitization agreement, ,to pay or cause to be paid 
to the Ljind 0v:ncr_in_ 9j1 !^? ';hQ valu- on kWz prcmi5Rg_ojL_tw^ and one-half 
percjMitL.COSlL^f_all the oil and r.as__and asso7Tated^iia"uid__hvdro-
carbons hcrco:rter_prQcluc.c,ci.% saved; and marketed therefrom or allocated 
thereto as aforesaid, except oil and gas and associated liquid 
. hydrocarbons used in operations on the premises or used under the 
unitization agreement-^ and except that as to casinghcad Caroline 
• and other producj;.c^manufactured fro:a gas there shall be deducted . • 
the cost pX^iTTanufacture; provided, however, that during any time 
' "t]}.S^ oScribcd promisor* or any portion thereof are included within 
^the boundaries of a participating;, pooled, or communitized area, 
(to which inclusion Land Owner expressly consents) and there is no 
provision for the payment of royaltj.es to Cho.mplin but it participates 
in the production from the pooled, comnnmitizec), or unit area as 
a working interest owner, then the two and one-half percent (2 1/2J-5) . 
above set forth shall be applied to that percentage of the total 
production from such area which is allocated to the described 
premises. 
When production of oil from lands under several surface 
ownerships is commingled in one central tank setting for practical 
operating reasons, periodic individual well tests may be made to 
compute the quantities of commingled oil properly allocable to 
. each well, and the two and one-half percent (2 lA#) payment 
provided herein shall be payable upon the quantities apportioned 
to each well as reported to Chamolin in full satisfaction of the 
obligations of Champlin under this Section 2. 
• * 
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.'MH%fP Section 3. Should the described premise?; or any portion 
..thereof ".at* any time be committed to a unitization agreement, the 
operatorron'unit operator under such agreement may exercise the 
^rights'*grantcd; under Section, 1'hereof during the period ending' 
fwith-fthe^fi'fth" calendar year' following the date of thin agreement 
-without''''compensation to the Land Owner other than payment as above 
^'provided,r-but after sai'd period'-'if-such; operator shall install; or
 yS- , 
£inaintain!r'anyr'facilities other rthan pipe or pole lines upon the-;. 'J;. 
^describedi-premises during any calendar year, it shall pay Land : ,v 
*0wner^0nc'*Doi:i.ar;)($1.00) "per acre for the acreage used during • 
?any"part;vof:t])at" calendar year, if such use substantially deprives-.. 
Hhe*Landowner of -the use of such acreage. The above amount of . \, 
lOne: Dollar?($1.00) per acre shall be subject to upward revision ..  
*uponTa'showing by the Land Owner1 that the--land involved has" 
^theretofore• .earned and is capable of,,earning a greater sum per acre. 
.^'."V*'* "i.V '\t'"Z- ;*v ***• ' L \ "••'••• •' -.•••'•'' ' • .'.' *• ' * , • •'!.'•* 
^ ^ I f f ^ p r S e c t i o n 4. Nothing herein contained sha l l be/construed 
£as ^ c o v e n a n t to d r i l l .by Clnamplin, i t s agents, l essees , l icensees," ^  
^successors;, i ; or ass igns . , or by"anyvoperator o r ' un i t operator, or as ;;\" 
I* a Grant-.to^Land Ownr/'of o i l or gas r igh ts or r igh ts in, other ; . . . . . 
r ;associated:vlic^xd hydrocarbons. ^ : ^ ; : ^ V - - ; ;;: .. .tl . •. " 
?*'$:$ ity?:*^tf*-\^ *:..:v,.v' ":•,-••--..•;•• •:< •t^~-'r^^lv:^---^ •'• " • •-• '--"- ''-;-•.•«.•>..•• - • •-• • 
X^^T^';;;^ Section 5. Champlin,'its agents, lessees, licensees, : •. 
^successors,' and assigns, including the opcra'tor or unit operator 
-under"a; unitization agreement, shall be required: (a) to pay •••••• 
& for "all' -damage to Land Owner's lands, buildings, and growing crops".:-; 
"caused by"the erection or construction of facilities to be used in 
£ connection'with oil or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon 
^operations;, (b) to bury all pipe lines below plow depth where such 
^linesvcross cultivated land] ,and'(c) to construct gates or at its- . 
^.option 'install-cattle guards where necessary for crossing fenced 
v.land ;in'rconnection with exploration, development, or producing 
^'"operations-and, where an election has been made to construct gates 
:•'in lieu of-cattle guards, to keep such gates in repair'and closed. 
'i^:"W\J:^%i:'-" "•' • • '•'••*' "'•''• • '" ' " ' 
'.•-/ '''llf-.' bisection 6. Other than the payments to be made as afore-
«
;?
* said," the'Land Owner shall not be entitled to any other or additional 
^payments ;jas a result of the conduct of operations upon the described 
^premises..^^.: ;'',-',':- . •..'. •-.^ ••w-'fe-:. ;-s>--.:. v * . ; '.-/.". •: . 
W^tiM#iV: /•'•••,•-.; •'•-••'#•«>• -; -,-• •• -• :« '••.'.-•:•. 
&$*••••H't Ii5^!Section 7. .Subject to the provisions of Section Q, 
$ - hereof- it in arrccd that the covenants to pay the sums provided in 
•  £• Sections 2. ^ . and r) hcrcof shall be covenants rumung._with_th.c_. , 
'
A
- ~ • * • - - - • - - " - - - - - - - • - - • - - - - - - - ^ — • ^ ~ h e l d 
S 
:/ 
vi F.urCnco. ownership of the described'premises and shall not, be he] 
•fc-pr tm.nsferred separately therefrom. an~l any sums~pnyaY>l'6 under 
,*ytthis agreement shall be paid to the person or persons owning _the 
*^"" surface of the described premises as of the date the oTl 6'f"~g^ " 
;*A. . . . . . . -^ .: . . . . . . . * . ' ' 
m^'m^i 
.,- 7*.;'.-i^.TtjC-* ? '*• 
^:fe,rvj jr 
• i / f e M t 
/ • V ' , ; ; . 
r/»-^. i^ i*:: . ;:;t;:,-;^;i j ' ^ ROOKIE-5 . f ' ^ y * ^ 
' •* ' * - •' -• '
,
* >«* • • : • . : • • . . i t . ' • . > • • • * . ' ' 
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i or associated liquid hydrocarbon production is.marketed. Champlin 
^shall not,|however, become obligated to'make such payments to any 
^subsequent5purchaser of the described, promises and shall continue 
£to;make'such payments to the Land Owner until the first day of the1 
!'month'; following the receipt by Champlin of notice of chance of ;':-
^ownership,^consisting of the original or certified copies of the .,-;... 
^!instfument^or instruments' constituting a complete chain' of title •'. 
Ijfrom^the^Land Owner: to the party claiming such ownership,"and then- * 
^only^asltojf payments thereafter", made. 1':; ;'••> •,... . r ; v ' ••'••• 
W ^ ' W ^ B - ^ ^ ^ ^ S - - '• :>v>-::. . :• "••""• •••. - .'• • "v *:"'- . '•;••:. 
^^^^/"'^^SectionBj The easements, fights, and uses herein shall 
r,:tbe binding"'upon the described premises and each oriel every part 
^thereof,Vand the present and future owners thereof, and shall ' •'••'•":;•' 
^continue'for the benefit of the present or future owners of- the ""/. 
vToil and/or gas and/or associated liquid hydrocarbon rights in the 
^described'premises and each and every part thereof and their 
^agents,-'lessees, licensees, successors, and assigns, including 
^any operator or.-unit operator, and for the benefit of other lands 
^v/ithin^any':unit area within*v.»hich the described premises, or any 
•^portion*, thereof may -be. -included,;L and each and every part thereof. . • 
U ^ S ^ ' W ' 1 ' ''••••'-"••' -:••'. '•'• - • ' • • ' • • ' • • ' - / • • • ' • •" • • • • ; • ; 
^'•
7,,
^v/"^•Section 9. This agreement shall be in full force and . 'V • 
•^•effect from' and after execution and delivery and shall continue 
!
^in full force and effect for a period of one (1) year and so 
^lonG-.thereafter as the oil and gas rights in the described premises 
jv? are committed to an oil and gas lease or license or to a unitization 
^agreement'',**..or so long as a well capable of producing oil or gas or 
£ associated liquid hydrocarbons is located upon the described premises, 
%pv drilling or reworking-operations.are being conducted thereon, ' • 
^andj^uponT-termination of such lease, license, or unitization agree- " 
lament,*-or^upon-abaJadjDrunent of such-well, or upon cessation of such 
vidrilling or reworking operations, whichever last occurs, this 
^nagreement shall terminate; provided, however, that such termination 
•lishall' neither affect nor terminate the rights, expressed or'implied, 
v^;in the !deed:or deeds referred to.in the Recitals hereof. 
* • • & > . » • - . • : * * . - ? , ; . ; - > . • • % • • " • ' . • " • • • ' ' : • • ' . . • • • ' . : • ' • ' . ' . . . • 
I ' W - ' ^ W - . f ? . ^ ' - • • . • . - • • : •. 
=*Ar.' '"rf- ; '^ ' 'Section 10. Subject t o the p rov i s ions of Sect ions 7 . . 
H and 9 'hereof , t h i s agreement s h a l l inure to the bene f i t of and 
^ v be binding.'upon the p a r t i e s here to and t h e i r r e spec t i ve h e i r s , 
i^iexecutors/ j a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , successors , and a s s i g n s . ••. .-•••••• 
^<":r:'0>-)JXSfefrlinn 1 1 . — ._ ,C.UJUS»"- • 
fc?of .the^above-named Land~Owhcr, does hereby3Sitt~wi4Th~hL;f* husband 
&• i n the execut ion of i.hr*-JVrrp^ri*nj; i-^rr^mFntt hereby r e l e a s i n g and 
&•' v;n-ivinnr n i l
 ritfxJ^ >,<p-)rniZorii-.(*r)e\ ami dower i n and to the lands above-
ffi^Sv&iSllN WITNESS WHEREOF,vtho part ; 
^.*/.. i : ^ ' p l t ^ ^ ^ . , : • • " • : • . ,•...':••;. . . . V , . .' •' ' : 
:£V'»M *H-i?'i- H^> * ^-"-'^ -. : > •" ' *.. •;-. v . • ' 
v.>. ' • ' % ^ v T ^ h i -: '* . •••.-••• - ".• • « ; ' r 
ics hereto have executed this 
» • . • . . • 
n rs r. •/ r.« ^  '*. P A P. P 3 4 1 * 
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r . v . . ' \ • '' " • * ' ' ' ! ' • 
^'agrccraentVas of. the day and year first above written. 
iI^^iti^<^-)r^ ••:'/^ ••.• ''^:^mCHAlv 
r'/"^W*. : •* "I" H h X VV^--:>•••*..; :•.<•• *<•- •+.*«•*&•?£• 
V#>;#v^ rV- <k-:?;y ^  --mm^-: • 
IPLIN PETROLEUM COMPANY. 
sss 
^ I^X^^Ufr^^ - , ' '^jg'By <£&UWM&. 
•\ ?r.'\Tjr i>,c'•.»•,•>'••''vC ?•£:•.'.•' Secretary ;v. ^ :;-'';: , • : . : . • • . • Vic^e President 
i^^ isj^ i^^ -i.:!;::;:^ -^ - : • ' • . • • • • * " • . • • • • • * 
«^^..^«^rA^;'--!--: •• ; ;A<!;K 1',syuws J- : , !''^v:> w:s s:;f-r;v COXIWIY, 
%*%**V!i«iLi. a COr. , ; f>] \<f , ,yr > n 
' •s •,«•'*.£/, 
•'.vo^V^^ " r / o j t t %%vr.»jr;*.V» -•• .,'*>,-r*'',-,!."i,:.v!.. ; . u -#.::^T'* '-1* ;- v • . • • ' .>? . '" ; 
• 'r*.?.»» • 
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CORPORATE .ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
i) ss '.'.•..'^ i^ ir^ . 
/, 19 n ; boforo 
ii(.COUntV--Of>C*-»»'^ -/- ) . ' y^i.^'^-&v^V;, \ -:4r..: • "• '• .:• 
^•%,;fi*^-^«[^^i;-: ^ ..|W^ ;^.i>-sUM?-;^ ''v-':i-*v..^ v.*vi--i, '::<Vi- '.•;:'. :-^ ->' 
^ r v V ^ ^ ^ i Kvrt-:>H-.;^J-v-^^:./*^>^:;;rv«^v - *•••- _ :.,=- •  - .. 
^ ' # & d * f ^  r~' *v;v£H _ A:V :" • i V ./V" • • ' >' 
&*M^#?%:on this" yV day o f > ^ t^7 
|.;mQ,f;a; Notary Public in and for said County/ in th«. utato aforoaaid, 
^personally:* appoarod f) a t' £// ^fl ^?)jt^L S1.t ^  / to. mo personally -
^knownjiandv^to mo personally, known to bo the 
h-^yj 
&V 
H" 
fcv • 
•H .J 
V HYRUM'J. NEKTON & SONS SHEEP COMPANY 
President of 
and to bo tho 
"•'V.\ 
::isame^person;whose nor.o Is subscribed to tho foregoing instrument;-... 
^..and'who^rVoing by mo duly, sworn,'did aay that ho i3 tho \? 
,prosidcnt:-of said Company;' that tho coal affixod to said instrurcont 
••• .j, i) ..,•) 
^
r
 i s .tho corporato soal of said Corporation/ and that caid instrursont 
r : - . * . * * , « - . . - v . • , ; • " - • ; ' * • ' ; • , r . . . . . . • . . : . . • . • ' . . . . , . • •* . . . . . • • 
»;••£• . ' i 1 ' - * * . » • . r ? V • • .- • 
f;wasr;signod? and 3onled on behalf of said corporation by authority 
?? of.-it 0s* Board of 'Directors; and the said /!?. -V/t' -7^; •??/.,•• /^ .., 
*\\'. • •* • • . •?• • ' / * * * H*:!c ! * • •. : v ' . ' " / 
^acknqwlodgod 3aid-inotrumont"tq bo hia freehand voluntary act and ' 
\: deod^^LndJ.the froo; and voluntary :act and dood of said Corporation, 
,^by i t l v o l u n t a r l l y exocuted, for the usos specif ied thoroln. > 
i/V- • V^r -ft. •/'??.:VN(: ' '' \ ••' •*• ' ' • •* • "•. 
K?r' rP^l%^^IN V/ITKESS HEREOF, I have h e r e u n t o s o t my hand and 
C ' '' vS^^;?1.*1" ",:"- :'.' ' - ••. '" • •• • : : ";' •••" " •  
^ o r f i c i a ^ c e a l the day,and yoar. above wrltton* 
' & ' . ^ K * ' ' ; ' ^ ? ' ? * * - ": •'•"*•••--•- :• - ' • • • • • • : : v . r . 
^^-^ ; . * # : ! ? ? • : •' ; ' ' ^"~ ~? > >
 n " 
l:^p:x?^^^ Expires * ^  <>, ,.<. 
• w ^ K ' j *••• v . - v / * ^ »i . ' j " j
 # ' . ^ . • * ; • • . . . . . • • ' - . - . « • • . - ' ^ # 
v-V.v*:. • •^ • •^ . .^ !^ f rv ; ••: •'• • 
M#
" . . . ^ V M / ' ? J V •:•' v •'" • 
/^v:f^v>/^^v-;;::/:./.. :> 
iw^v-^^-^^"' U • 
:'.:i ' :.v- / ^ 
ZlZf£ 
/ • jfotury Public 
• .^ W ' ; , - ^ / 7 
Ro3lding at C~\-*-t.C",t sts* <•<" >* c~\ 
> • » • , . 
1/ ' , . . . V 
•'. . 'Vr ; V \ v ; -
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DEED 
IV-:-
r 
H 
Thia dmmd datad February 1, 1972, at Slit LMM Cllj, Ulsli. 
!• Fartiea and Interests Conveyed. 
*+y N: . XL33D* Book.». 37 
KECCfOEO 3-20-72 , ,1:1^ ( /-^285=9 
^ 2 I S » 3 i S s "ratrfrprls * *^ C**"~ 
i^^ AI *»«. w'-o* " s-.-.-r- r;»/u?r c? fsoaumt 
;«orw. 
... NECTON SHEEP COKPAHT, ~ 
• A Limited Fartnarahip 
3744 South 6400 Vast |£j| *< • Salt Lake City, Utah S4120, 
harain called tha Grantor, in conaidaration of tha an* of Tan and Mora Dollars, 
; ^  * in hand paid, and othar conaidaration, doaa hereby grant, bargain, aell, convoy, 
transfer, aaalgn and deliver onto: 
•ASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO. 
1211 Fort Worth Rational Bank Building 
Fort Vorth, Texas, 
t } harain callad tha Grantee, tha intaraata described in aubparagraph A« of thia 
$:' | paragraph 1, in aubparagraph B. of thia paragraph 1, and in aubparagraph C. of 
! j thia paragraph X» 
I 
1 • I 
1. An undivided 1/2 interest in and to all of tha oil, gaa and othar 
i I minerals in and under and that nay bo produced from the following 
.* ij described landa situated in Summit County, State of Utah, to-vit: 
Fee Lands. 
L-4636 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED. SIGNED FOR IDENTIFICATION AND INCORPORATED 
HEREIN BY REFERENCE • ~ 
together with tha.right off ingress and egraaa at all tlsaa for tha 
purpose of operating and developing aald landa for. oil, gaa and 
other minerals, and marketing tha same therefrom with the right to 
remove from aald landa all of Grantee1a property and ImproVemcnta, 
including the ralaaaa and waiver of tha right of homestead. 
This conveyance la made aubject to any rights now axiatlng to 
any laaaaa or assigns under any valid and subsisting oil and gaa * 
laaaa of record heretofore executed; t t being understood and agreed 
that said Grantee ahall have, receive and anJoy the herein granted 
undivided interest in and to all bonuses, rente, royaltiaa and 
other benefits which may accrue under tha terms of aaid laaaa 
insofar aa it covers the above described land from and after tha 
date hereof, precisely ae if tha Grantee herein had been at tha 
data of the making of aald laaaa the owner of a aimilar undivided 
intereat in and to tha landa described and Grantee one of tha 
leeeore therein* \* / 
2. Subject to the apacific terme of paragraph ZX hereof, and except 
for tha lands described in aubparagraph B. (Exhibit NB" attached), 
it ia tha apeelfic intent of tha Grantor harain to convey a 1/2 
mineral intereat in all lands owned by the Grantor in tha follow* 
leg townships located in Summit County, Utah: 
*<* Township 1 Worth, Range 7 East 
Township 2 North, Range 7 Eaat 
Township 3 North, Range 7 Eaat 
Township 1 North, Range 6 Eaat 
Township 2 North, Range 6 Eaat 
r 
It la specifically understood that no intereat of any type in tha 
landa described in subparagraph B. hereof la conveyed under tha 
terms of thia aubparagraph A* 
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8. Onion Pacific Railroad Company Landa/ 
One-half of tha royalty (of any typa) froa production of alnerala that 
tha Crantor actually receivee* or la antltlad to racaiva until February 1* 
2072-* froa tha following daacribad land: 
SEE EXHIBIT "8" ATTACHED. SICKED FOR IDENTIFICATION AND INCORPORATED HEREIH 8Y 
KFERENCE. • ' ' 
Za addition to tha apaclfic varrantiaa of paragraph IV hereof* tha 
Crantor* aa a raal covenant, apecifically covenante that the intaraat conveyed 
in thia aubparagraph 8. conatitutaa a mutual covenant running with tha land 
daacrlbed on Exhibit ."8", and all aucceaslve future owners of the intaraat 
conveyed under the provlalona of thia aubparagraph 8«* shall have the'right 
to invoke and enforce lta prorlaiona aa the original algnera thereto. 
C. Preferential Right of Purchase. . . 
. After the data of thia deed, in the event that tha Crantor receives 
and intends to accept a bona fide offer for the purchase of any intareat in 
either the alnerala or tha right to receive royalty (of any type) owned or 
acquired by the Crantor, in the following townships located in Summit County* 
Utah* . 
Township 1 Rorth* Range 7 Eaat 
Township 2 North, Range 7 Eaat 
Township 3 North* Range 7 East 
Township 1 North* Range 6 Eaat 
Township 2 North* Range 6 Eaat* 
or any part thereof or lntereat therein* froa a person* fira or corporation* 
ready* able and willing to purchase any Interest in either the alnerala or 
the right to receive royalty (of any type) owned or acquired by the Crantor* 
part thereof or interest therein, the Crantor lssedlately ahall give written 
notice thereof to the Grantee, including in aald notice the nana and address 
of such offeror, the price offered and all other pertinent terms and con-
ditions of the offer. The Grantee, for a period of 15 daya after the receipt 
of said notice, ahall have the prior and preferred right and option to 
purchase froa the Crantor* any lntereat in either the alnerala or the right 
to receive royalty (of any type) owned or acquired by the Crantor* or the 
part thereof or interest therein* covered by aald offer at tha price and 
according to the terms and conditions apeclfled in aald offer; provided'* 
that, if the Grantee*fails to exercise its tmii right and option by giving 
written notice of lta acceptance within.15 daya after receipt of the above 
aentioned notice, the Crantor ahall accept aald offer and complete aald aale 
in accordance with aald offer within 60 daya after the expiration of said 
period of 15 daya; and provided* further* that if tha Crantor faila to aecept 
aald offer or to complete aald aale within aald period of 60 daya* tha pre-
ferred right and option of the Grantee under thia paragraph ahall be con-> 
aldered aa revived, and the Crantor ahall not complete 9mid aale to aald 
prospective purchaser unless and until aald offer egaln has been presented 
to the Grantee, aa hereinabove provided* and the Grantee again haa failed to 
elect to purchaaa on the terms and conditions of said offer. All offare at 
any time aade to the Grantor, ita aucceaaora* heirs and assigns, for the 
purchaaa of any interest in the alnerala or tha right to receive royalty 
(of any type) owned or acquired by the Crantor* or any part thereof or 
lntereat therein, ahall be aubject to all tha terms and condltloae of thia 
paragraph until January 1* 2012* at which time the obligations of thia 
paragraph ahall cease* 
II. Reservation of Coal. . 
There la apecifically excepted and reserved froa this grant* all of tha 
lntereat Grantor owna in tha coal (and the right to receive royalty of any type 
froa coal production)* on any lands daacribad on Exhibita "A19 and "8" attached 
hereto. The Crantor further excepts and reserves the right to explore for or 
alne coal* and to grant to parties other than the Grantee* leases covering coal. 
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III. general. 
A*. Grantor releases tha right of homestead. 
• * • • * • • . • - . . • 
1. There is consideration for this deed. ' " . ' . . 
• 
C. Grantor agrees to execute such further assurances as nay be requisite 
for the full and complete enjoyment of the rights herein granted9 and likewise 
agrees that Grantee herein shall have the.right at any time to redeem for said 
Grantor by payment, any mortgage, taxes or other liana on the above described 
• land, upon default in payment by Grantor, and be subrogated to the rights of 
the holder thereof* 
* * * • 
X?. ' . Warranty. . . * . 
To have and to hold tha above described property with all and singular tha 
rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto or in anywise belonging to the aaid 
•Grantee herein, ita halra, successors,, parsonal representatives, administrators, 
executors and aasigna forever, and Grantor does hereby warrant aaid title to 
Grantee, ita halra, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors 
and assigns forever, and does hereby agree to defend all and singular tha said 
property unto the aaid Grantee herein, its heirs, successors, executors, parsonal 
representatives and assigns against every person whomsoever claiming or to claim 
the same or any part thereof. 
V« Woticca. 
Notices required under the terms of this deed, snail be given to tha partiaa 
at tha addresses shown in paragraph Z hereof* 
DATED February 1, 1972. 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY 
A Limited Partnership 
g T : / & ^ ) 7 g ^ ^ " t 
* C*nei General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH > 
) ••• 
COUNTT OF SALT LAKE) 
On February 1, 1972, personally appeared before me, lalph M. Newton 
General Partner for Newton Sheep Company, a limited partnership, that signed the 
above Instrument, who duly acknowledged to ma that he^e^rcuted the 
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS DEED AXE AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED BT: %*!«.>w, .»„•.:.». 1 • 
IASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO. \^-£X? *' 
K\ • "Ji^tl? /fttrtHitvff*^ 
> t 
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EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED. SICKED FOR IDENTIFICATION ASP INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 
Township 
Section 
Section 
I North. Range 
4: 
6: 
7 East. 
StfcNEfc; SfsNU% 
Lota 1# 2. 3 , 4 
Township 2 North, Ransc 7 East. 
SLM 
• 
SLM 
Section 4: Lot 1; S%NE%; S&iKWc; NEkStft; SE%; EXCEPT 13.4 acres described 
aa beginning at a point South 1,634.16 feet and East 1,505*11 
* feet fro* & corner of said Section 49 thence South 34°179 East 
221.2 feet; thence forth 88°07f East 276.6 feet; thence North 
10°289 Vest 742.5 feet; thence North 79°289 Vest 291.38 feet; 
thence forth 74°489 Vest.471.79 feet; thence South 35°229 Vest 
311.75 feet; thence on a 7*30* curve to the right through an 
• are of 606.7 feet to'beginning. 
Section 6s Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; SEfcNW%; &5SU9*; SE% 
Section S: A H 
Section 16: All 
Section 18: Lota 1, 2, 3, 4; !%W%; E% 
Section 20: All 
Section 22: Lots 1, 2 9 3, 4; $Wn S% 
Section 28: All 
Section 30: Lota 1, 2 9 3. 4; E%W%; Efe 
Section 32: All 
Section 34: All 
Township 3 North. Range 7 East. SLM 
Section 30: ©sSEk 
Section 32: N%NW*t; ALSO, beginning at the NE comer of S&NW9*, thence 
Vest 160 rods; thence South 160 rods; thence North 45° East 
226 rods to place of beginning* 
Section 34: Stftftfc; SZHHtkl NE%SV%; SlfeSEfc; HEfcSEfe • 
Township 1 North. Range 6 East. SLM \ 
Section 2: Lots 1, 2. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Sf ~ 
Township 2 North. Range 6 East. SIM •. 
Section 12: All 
Section 24: E%E*j; NW-cNEfc; NE^NU%; StrtcSEJ* AND ALSO a tract containing 57.67 
acres described B9 beginning at the Sk corner of said Section 24, 
thence North 89°269 Vest 0.52 chains; thence North 18°139 Vest 
.1.60 chains; thence North 50°569 Vest 12 chains; thence North 
2°309 Vest 2.40 chains; thenee North 26°279 Vest 4.70 chains; 
thence forth 23°109 Vest 3 chains; thenee North 22°569 Vest 
4.50 chains; thence forth 19°389 Vest 3.10 chains; thence North 
30°329 Vest 3.60 chains; thence forth 24°239 Vest 11.30 chains; 
thence forth 0°509 Vest 1.40 chains; thenee forth 43°439 Vest 
1.30 chains; thence forth 39°429 Vest 1 chain; thence forth 
34°39 Vost 0.70 chains; thence forth 56°20f Vest 0.30 chains; 
thenee forth 32°319 Vest 5.30 chains; thence forth 38°29 Vest 
1.90 chains; thence forth 3°39 Vest 8.50 chains to NE corner 
of SV*NV%; thence East 20 chains; thence South 60 chains to 
point of beginning. 
Section 36: Beginning at the NE corner of said Section 36, thence South 
along the Section line 80 chains to SE corner of said Section 
36; thence Vest along the Section line to the SV corner of 
aald Section 36; thenee forth along the Section line 20 chains; 
thence forth 77°339 East 53.40 chains; thence North 28°529 
East 10 chains; thence North 1°039 Vest 40 chains to the Section 
line; thence East along the Section line 25.33 chains to 
beginning* • ^ 
Suaait County, Utah 
Containing 9316.04 Acres, 
More or Less. 
L~4636 
NEVT0N SHEEP COMPANY 
jk Limited Partnership 
IfeUfJL ^yiutsfc**' 
/ r l General Pa: 
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EXHIBIT "B" ATTACHED. SIGNED TOR IDENTIFICATION* ANT) INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 
* • 
Township 2 Norths Range 7 East. SIM • 
. Section 7: Lots 1, 29 3, 4; P&il E% 
Section 9:* All 
• Section 15: All * / -
Section 17: All 
Section 19: Lots 1, 2 , 3 , 4^ E%U%; E% 
Section 21: Lots 1 , 2 t 3 , 4 t 5; SEfcKEfc; Htfj; ftSWfc; SEfe . 
Section 27: All 
Section 29: Lots l t 2 , 3 ; 4 , 5 ; SEfcffEfe; KW*s; ftSWk; SE% 
Section 31: Lots 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6, 7; S%?*Efc; SE%NW*t; 0sSW«; SEfc 
Section 33: All 
Township 3 Worth, Range 7 East. SIM 
Section 19: Beginning at the SV corner of Section 19,° thence North 
along section line 2,640 feet; East 4639.7 feet; South 
12*35' Vest 300 feet; South 40°539 Vest 393.76 feet South 
* 49*28* Vest 333.73 feet; South 37*50' Vest 288 feet South 
3*48' East 154.4 feet; South 13*25' Vest 317.0 feet; 
South 41*33' Vest.316.0 feet; South 57*39' Vest 196.6 feet; 
• South 25*59' Vest 265.3 feet; South 24*59' Vest 192.2 feet; 
South 26*04' Vest 261.7 feet; South 0*06v East 153.28 feet 
to South line of Section 19; thence Vest 3,114.46 feet to 
beginning. 
Section 29: SW% 
Section 31: E% of Section 31, less 45.91 acres In 2 exceptions. 
Section 33: All 
Township 1 Worth, Range 6 East. SIM 
Section 1 : Lots 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6, 7 , S, 9 , 10, 11 , 12, 13, 14; tfjSflc; SWfc 
Township 2 Worth. Range 6 East. SIM 
Section 1: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4; S%$*; Sfc' 
Section 13: Beginning 12.45 chains South 89*39* East of SV corner of :~ 
Section 13, thence Worth 17*42' Vest 40.01 chains. -North 
40 chains; South 89*31* East 79.5 chains; South 80 chains; 
Worth 89*39' Vest 66.75 chains to beginning. 
Section 25: 132.83 acres In KEfc of Section 25, 142.1 acres In ft of 
Section 25 
Susnlt Count/, Utah 
Containing 10,003.70 Acres, More or Less. 
WEUTO* SHEEP COMPANY 
A limited Partnership 
nttfyUbA ynytUirkxy 
f Central Pi G e artner 
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